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Abstract
We argue that several apparently distinct responses to the hole argument, all invoking formal
or mathematical considerations, should be viewed as a unified “mathematical response”.
We then consider and rebut two prominent critiques of the mathematical response before
reflecting on what is ultimately at issue in this literature.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Weatherall (2018) contends that careful attention to mathematical prac-
tice reveals that the “hole argument”, familiar from the foundations of general relativity
(GR), is fallacious.1 At issue is whether the hole argument, by implicitly invoking a priv-
ileged identification of spacetime points in distinct models of GR, thereby makes use of
mathematical structure (something like “point identity”) that those models should not be
understood to possess. This argument has been controversial. Some, such as Fletcher (2020)
have contended that yes, the hole argument is blocked by these considerations;2 whereas oth-
ers, such as Arledge and Rynasiewicz (2019), Roberts (2020), and Pooley and Read (2021)
deny it.
Weatherall’s response to the hole argument is sometimes characterized as “mathematical”
(as opposed to “metaphysical”). But it is not the only “mathematical” response in the
literature. Shortly after the hole argument was introduced to the philosophy of physics
Email addresses: cbradle1@uci.edu (Clara Bradley), weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1We briefly state the hole argument in section 2.
2Curiel (2018) and Halvorson and Manchak (2021) apparently endorse this claim as well; see also Bradley
and Weatherall (2020).
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literature by Earman and Norton (1987), Mundy (1992) offered an apparently different
mathematical response, according to which considerations from formal semantics should be
seen to block the hole argument. And more recently, largely in parallel to the literature
responding to Weatherall, Shulman (2017) has observed that the hole argument cannot be
expressed in Homotopy Type Theory with Univalent Foundations (HoTT/UF), a recent
program in the foundations of mathematics (The Univalent Foundations Program (2013)).3
All of these arguments agree on at least one claim: prior to any questions about metaphysics,
the hole argument should be rejected as mathematically illegitimate.4
The goal of the present paper is to explore the relationship between Mundy’s response
to the hole argument and the more recent responses by Weatherall and Shulman. We argue
that all three arguments are substantially the same, and that considering them together
helps isolate the core consideration behind all of them: the hole argument requires one to
express facts about models of GR that cannot be expressed in “the language of GR”, on
any reasonable understanding of what that could mean.5 Instead, one must move outside of
GR, by augmenting the theory in some way, or by invoking the resources of a background
metatheory, such as set theory. This point can be made by regimenting the “language of
GR” via a higher-order axiomatization, as Mundy does; or it may be made by appeal to
HoTT/UF, as Shulman does; or it may be made by appeal to mathematical practice, as
Weatherall does. Perhaps most importantly, in all three cases, the project is not to solve
an interpretational problem by adopting some novel formal apparatus; rather, it is to argue
that the (formal) problem allegedly raised by the hole argument is illusory.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, we will briefly
review the hole argument and comment on “metaphysical” responses. Then, we will intro-
3Ladyman and Presnell (2020) offer a helpful elaboration and clarification of Shulman’s argument.
4Another broadly “mathematical” response is due to Iftime and Stachel (2006), but to relate that paper
to those discussed here would require more space than we have.
5Weatherall (2018, fn. 4) resists parallels with Mundy, but for spurious reasons.
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duce the three “mathematical” responses under consideration. We will focus on Mundy’s
response and use it to interpret Weatherall’s and Shulman’s. We will then consider two
criticisms of the mathematical response, from Rynasiewicz (1996) and Roberts (2020). We
conclude by discussing what the mathematical response really amounts to, and relating it
to other issues connected to reference and representation.
2. The Hole Argument
The hole argument, at least in its modern form, invokes the following mathematical consid-
erations.6 Given a model of GR, which for these purposes is a pseudo-Riemannian manifold,
(M, gab), one can construct another model (M, g
′
ab), isometric to the first, by fixing any dif-
feomorphism ψ : M → M and defining g′ab to be the pushforward of gab along ψ, ψ∗(gab).7
If the diffeomorphism is not the identity on M , then these models disagree at certain points
on the value of the metric; and yet, they are isometric by construction, and therefore they
are equivalent as pseudo-Riemannian manifolds.
These facts are widely taken to present a dilemma. It appears that (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab)
are distinct models that, by virtue of being isometric, agree on all “observable” structure.
Thus, if one takes distinct models of GR to correspond to distinct physical situations, the
theory distinguishes situations that have no observable differences. Worse, since ψ may be
the identity outside of some precompact set, it seems to follow that the metric outside of
that set cannot “determine” the metric within it. And so, the argument goes, a manifold
substantivalist – that is, a certain kind of “realist” about GR who accepts that distinct mod-
els of the theory, in the sense just described, reflect distinct possibilities – incurs significant
costs.
6The “modern” hole argument is most often associated with Earman and Norton (1987); but it has a
prehistory both in Einstein’s early work on GR (Stachel, 1989; Norton, 1984) and in more philosophical
work by Stein (1977) and Earman (1977) on Leibniz (see Weatherall, 2020).
7For background on GR and the conventions adopted here, see Malament (2012).
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Most authors responding to the hole argument take the basic issue to be metaphysical.8
They agree that GR presents us with distinct models of the sort contemplated here, and
that these naturally represent distinct situations; to avoid the dismal conclusions, a would-be
realist (or substantivalist) must adopt a metaphysical view on space and time that denies that
these putatively distinct possibilities are genuinely different. Of particular concern has been
whether or not one’s metaphysics is compatible with the doctrine of Leibniz Equivalence,
according to which any pair of isometric pseudo-Riemannian manifolds represent the same
possible world. Manifold substantivalists reject Leibniz equivalence; many authors have
developed flavors of sophisticated substantivalism, or qualified realism, according to which
one can accept Leibniz Equivalence while still endorsing some form of substantivalism.
3. The Mathematical Response
As we noted in the Introduction, there is another tradition of responses to the hole argument
that seeks to avoid the metaphysical considerations just discussed. Instead, they argue,
one should reject the background mathematical claims that others take to generate the
hole argument. Roughly: one should deny that there is any relevant sense in which the
construction used in the hole argument generates “distinct” pseudo-Riemannian manifolds.
Thus, even a realist who takes distinct models to correspond to distinct possibilities can
block the hole argument.
Mundy (1992) defends this position by showing that pseudo-Riemannian geometry ad-
mits an “intrinsic axiomatization” in higher-order logic. Formal semantics then provides a
precise characterization of a model of pseudo-Riemannian geometry as representable by a
set-theoretic structure, of a particular signature, satisfying the axioms of the theory under
some interpretation; it also determines a notion of isomorphism between such structures.
8For up-to-date reviews of metaphysical reactions of the hole argument, see Pooley (2013) or Norton
(2019). Roberts and Weatherall (2020) discuss the more recent literature.
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The notion of isomorphism one arrives at from his intrinsic axiomatization – and, indeed,
by any reasonable axiomatization – coincides with isometry on other presentations of the
theory.9
Mundy argues that formal theories of this kind only determine their models up to iso-
morphism, in the precise sense that any statement in the language of the theory that is true
in a structure S is true in any structure S ′ isomorphic to S. In other words, no sentence in
the theory can distinguish S and S ′. Thus isomorphic models are “semantically equivalent”
(p. 517), which is equivalence “in the strongest possible sense” (p. 519). But the models
at issue in the hole argument, by virtue of being isometric, are isomorphic in this sense. He
concludes that these models do not present putatively distinct possibilities, as required in
the hole argument, because they are not distinct models.
What led others to think that Leibniz equivalence was a substantive doctrine? Mundy
offers the following diagnosis. The semantic equivalence of set-theoretic structures repre-
senting models of pseudo-Riemannian geometry means that there are no differences between
the structures that can be expressed within the “language of GR”.10 But one can also step
outside of the theory and, by invoking the further expressive resources of the “semantic met-
alanguage” – basically, ZFC set theory – one can express differences between set-theoretic
representations of models of the theory. Mundy claims that it is by conflating statements
in these two languages that one is led into the hole argument, for it is only in the semantic
metalanguage that one can express the claim that the “same” point has “different” metric
values in two isomorphic models. But assertions in the semantic metalanguage do not have
physical significance. They are not assertions within GR.
On its face, Mundy’s position is different from those defended in the more recent litera-
9Mundy also offers a ground-clearing argument that coordinate-based formulations of pseudo-Riemannian
geometry are semantically ambiguous. We focus here on the second, positive part of his argument.
10Or at least, the language of pseudo-Riemannian manifolds. GR would presumably extend this language,
but not in ways that affect the argument.
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ture. Most notably, Mundy’s argument apparently turns on the introduction of an intrinsic
axiomatization of pseudo-Riemannian geometry; on the other hand, Weatherall’s argument
is that the hole argument does not go through on the standard (modern, coordinate-free)
formalism of GR. But in fact, we claim, the arguments are much closer than they appear.
Weatherall argues that, as a principle of mathematical practice, mathematical objects
are defined only up to isomorphism, where what counts as an “isomorphism” for a given
mathematical object is determined by the mathematical theory of those objects. And so,
when we aim to represent some physical situation using objects of a certain kind, subject to
a given mathematical theory, the “representational capacities” of those objects are invari-
ant under isomorphism, meaning that isomorphic objects can represent any given situation
equally well. Inasmuch as the standard of isomorphism for pseudo-Riemannian manifolds
is isometry, the models of concern in the hole argument have the same representational
capacities. From this he concludes that the hole argument is blocked, because any sense in
which the models invoked in the hole argument differ is not reflected in their representational
capacities.
Some parallels with Mundy’s argument are immediately apparent. Like Mundy, Weather-
all’s key premise is that certain mathematical objects – viz. pseudo-Riemannian manifolds
– are defined only up to isometry, and for that reason, isometric manifolds are in some sense
“the same”. Mundy gets to this via an axiomatization and formal semantics; Weatherall
gets to it by observing that mathematicians generally intend to attribute to mathematical
objects only structure that is preserved by the relevant notion of isomorphism. Both agree
that whatever else is the case, putative differences between pseudo-Riemannian manifolds
that are not preserved by isometry lack representational, or semantic, significance. Since
the hole argument turns on such non-invariant facts, Mundy and Weatherall both conclude
that it cannot be stated using just the structure, or language, of GR.
But what about where the hole argument goes wrong? Here, Weatherall and Mundy
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appear to differ. For Weatherall, the problem arises due to a conflation between two different
relationships that obtain between (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab), captured by two different maps
between these structures. On the one hand, there is an isometry between (M, gab) and
(M, g′ab) which is realised by ψ. Compared relative to ψ, (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) are merely
two set-theoretic representations of a single pseudo-Riemannian manifold. On the other
hand, there is the identity map on M , which allows one to talk about particular manifold
points. Compared relative to the identity map, (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) are not mathematically
equivalent. Therefore, although one can say that there are points at which the metric differs
when comparing the models using the identity map, one cannot simultaneously maintain
that the situations represented by such models are equivalent. As he puts it, “There is a
sense in which (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) are the same, and there is a sense in which they are
different. ... But—and this is the central point—one cannot have it both ways” (Weatherall,
2018, p. 338)
This part of Weatherall’s argument has been particularly controversial. After all, in
many contexts it is sensible to say that two (distinct) things are the same in some respects
and different in others; such relationships can often be expressed via two or more mappings
between those things.11 We think Weatherall’s argument may be clarified, here, by reading
it as an alternative statement of Mundy’s. For Mundy, recall, what goes wrong in the
hole argument is that any differences between isometric spacetimes can only be expressed
by moving to the semantic metatheory, where one has additional expressive resources. We
suggest that this move to the semantic metalanguage corresponds to what Weatherall takes
to be required in order to distinguish (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) using the identity on M ; namely,
“one must be invoking some other, additional structure that is not preserved by isometry”
(p. 338). This additional structure is precisely the (extensional) structure concerning the
domains, M , that is referred to by the language of the metatheory of pseudo-Riemannian
11This objection is raised forcefully by Pooley and Read (2021).
7
manifolds. Meanwhile, the sense in which the models are the same for Weatherall is that
they have the same structure as pseudo-Riemannian manifolds. This explains why, in section
5 of his paper, Weatherall argues the hole argument would go through if one began with
a different kind of mathematical structure, where the points of a manifold were associated
with unique labels.
We now turn to the argument from HoTT/UF. For Shulman (2017), the central claim
is that HoTT/UF formalizes, using the methods of intensional type theory, the idea that
mathematical objects of a given variety – or, in the formal sense of HoTT, terms of a
given type – are defined only up to a specified standard of equivalence. Assertions about
those objects within HoTT/UF must be “covariant”, i.e., preserved, mutatis mutandis,
under equivalences between objects of that type. And for the type “pseudo-Riemannian
manifolds”, the equivalences are precisely isometries. Thus, as Shulman puts it, “anything
we can say in [HoTT/UF] about [pseudo-Riemannian manifolds] is automatically covariant
under isometry” (p. 53). It follows that the hole argument cannot be formulated within
HoTT/UF, because there is no way to express the (non-covariant) claim that the pseudo-
Riemannian manifolds (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) differ in their assignments of metric values
to points.12 Moreover, Shulman argues that the problem with the hole argument is that it
illegitimately conflates two different maps from M to M , much as Weatherall does (p. 40).13
We take it that this argument is substantially the same as Mundy and Weatherall’s.
One might respond that there is an important difference: for Shulman, it is HoTT/UF that
dissolves the hole argument, whereas neither Weatherall nor Mundy appear to require type
theory. But this difference is chimerical. HoTT/UF, for Shulman, is just a way of being
precise about the idea that mathematical objects are only defined up to isomorphism—
something Mundy and Weatherall defend on other grounds. One way of thinking about the
12Ladyman and Presnell (2020) argue that in fact, Univalence is not necessary for this conclusion.
13See also Ladyman and Presnell (2020, p. 323).
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situation is that HoTT/UF provides an alternative to the set-theoretic semantics that Mundy
(explicitly) and Weatherall (implicitly) use for representing pseudo-Riemannian manifolds,
preventing one from inadvertently shifting into the semantic metalanguage in the way Mundy
and Weatherall criticize.
4. No “Syntactic” Solutions?
In the previous section, we isolated an argument – the “mathematical response” to the hole
argument – offered, in superficially different forms, by several authors. The mathematical
response states that the hole argument, by invoking a privileged identification of spacetime
points across models of general relativity, involves assertions, or invokes structure, that go
beyond the theory of GR and should be viewed as representationally irrelevant.
The various articulations of the mathematical response have been criticised on several
fronts. Here we consider two such critiques. The first, due to Rynasiewicz (1996), is directed
at Mundy’s version of the argument;14 whereas the second, due to Roberts (2020), is directed
at Weatherall’s. We suggest that both can be rebutted by keeping in mind the mathematical
response as just stated.
Rynasiewicz (1996) attributes to Mundy the view that “the difficulties allegedly posed
[by the hole argument] evaporate if only the theories in question are suitably formulated
in an appropriate formal language. In this sense [he offers] a syntactic solution to the
hole argument” (p. 855). But the hole argument presents a semantic, or metaphysical,
problem: it concerns the relationships between possible worlds. And one cannot dissolve
an interpretational problem through merely “syntactic” considerations, or by introducing a
novel formalism for expressing the theory. If a given formal language is unable to express
an interpretational dilemma, it simply lacks the resources to capture something of manifest,
14Rynasiewicz also responds to Leeds (1995), who he takes to offer a similarly “syntactic” response to the
hole argument; in our view, the Leeds response is different and we do not consider it here.
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prior significance. Moreover, Rynasiewicz argues, the hole argument could be expressed
within Mundy’s framework if one simply added constants to the theoretical language by
which one could specify the coordinates of any point in a given chart.
A similar charge might be leveled against Shulman’s argument, since he, too, invokes a
novel formal framework, and then argues that the hole argument cannot be expressed within
that framework. But this response seems to mistake the role that formal methods play for
Mundy and Shulman. As we read Mundy, the key issue is not whether the hole argument
can be expressed in his preferred axiomatization; rather, it is whether it can be expressed
in any language for which model isomorphism coincides with isometry. Shulman, likewise,
uses HoTT/UF only to regiment the ideas, already widespread among mathematicians, that
mathematical objects are only defined up to some notion of equivalence or isomorphism and
reasoning about those objects must be covariant.
Rynasiewicz’s suggestion that the theory can be extended, meanwhile, amounts to chang-
ing GR, so that isometry is no longer the relevant standard of isomorphism. This sort of
response is the same as the one Weatherall contemplates when he argues that in running the
hole argument, philosophers implicitly augment the structure of pseudo-Riemannian mani-
folds to compare points across models. But Mundy (1992) also anticipates, and rebuts, such
a response. He says: “philosophers are welcome to construct modal extensions of physical
theories. However, I claim that nothing in standard physical theory supports such exten-
sions: no scientific problem requires introduction of any primitive relation extending across
different models. The fact that transworld identity revives the hole argument is merely
another objection to it” (p. 522). In other words, while one can extend the theory to ac-
commodate the hole argument, there are no empirical or scientific justifications for doing
so.
Rynasiewicz goes on to observe that Mundy’s argument has the following steps. Sup-
pose that one has a formal semantics for a given theory. Then, (1) isomorphic models
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satisfy exactly the same sentences. Hence (2) isomorphic models are semantically equiva-
lent. Therefore (3) isomorphic models represent the same physical situations. Rynasiewicz
argues that if Mundy gets from (1) to (2) by defining semantic equivalence as satisfying the
same sentences, then (3) does not follow from (2) without further assumptions. More im-
portantly, Rynasiewicz contends that these further assumptions must go past merely formal
considerations.
In particular, Rynasiewicz argues that whether two isomorphic models can represent the
same situation depends upon whether the isomorphism “preserves whatever facts must be
in place in order to continue to identify the items in the domain of discourse assuming the
same repertoire of identification methods” (p. S57), which “transcends standard formal
semantics” (S59). Rynasiewicz uses the following example to support this claim. Imagine
that one has a deck of cards, and a theory that includes predicates for suit, rank, and
order in the deck. This theory tells us the standard facts about a deck of cards, such
as the distribution of suit and rank, and it asserts that the order is strictly linear. Now
consider a model of this theory, and a map that is a permutation of the domain. One can
generate a new model of the theory, isomorphic to the first, via the standard pushforward
construction. Mundy, presumably, would say these two models are semantically equivalent.
But Rynasiewicz argues that whether we should think of these as representing distinct
situations depends on the full set of resources one has for identifying objects in the domain
of these models, including ones outside the theory such as whether the cards bear additional,
observable markers.
We agree that purely formal considerations do not settle the issue. But Rynasiewicz’s
example is not analogous to the hole argument. The reason is that Rynasiewicz supposes
one can (observationally) distinguish his isomorphic models through features that are not
represented in the theory. In other words, the theory is only a partial description of the world.
For the theory to be a full description, one must extend the theory to include the further
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properties under consideration. On the other hand, the hole argument is supposed to present
a problem for someone who takes GR to provide a complete description of spatio-temporal
structure—that is, a “realist” about spacetime in GR. Such a person is not concerned that the
theory cannot express physically significant facts about space and time, much less observable
ones; to the contrary, they hypothesize that space and time have just the structure described
by the theory of pseudo-Riemannian manifolds, and no more.
We now turn to Roberts (2020), who, echoing Rynasiewicz, writes that whether isomor-
phic models of a theory represent the same physical situation depends upon “how we happen
to use language to represent the physical world” in a particular domain of discourse. But his
argument is different. Roberts claims that Weatherall equivocates between two premises.
One, which Roberts accepts as well-motivated, is that isomorphic objects can always repre-
sent the same situations. The second, stronger, view is that isomorphic objects can always
represent the same situation “at once”, or, “in the same concrete interpretation”, where
by this he means relative to a particular specification of the physical entities to which the
elements of the domain of the model correspond.
According to Roberts, to block the hole argument one would need to show that any
two isometric pseudo-Riemannian manifolds can represent the same physical situation “at
once”. But this, he argues, cannot be done. Consider the open half-plane (M, gab) where
M = R× (0,∞) and gab is the Minkowski metric restricted to this manifold. Now translate
the half-plane up by some amount a into itself to produce the model (M ′, gab) where M
′ =
R × (a,∞). This translated model is isometric to the first. But (M ′, gab) is also a proper
subset of (M, gab), since (a,∞) is a proper subset of (0,∞). Since a proper subset of a
spacetime represents only “part” of the physical situation that the original spacetime does,
these two models, despite being isometric, cannot represent the same situation “at once”.
Roberts allows that an applied mathematician can neglect this relationship between the
models—but only by allowing the concrete interpretation of the models to vary. Thus
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mathematical considerations alone cannot block the hole argument; in addition, one needs
to make further interpretational choices about how to use mathematical models in specific
representational contexts.
It should be clear from the foregoing that Roberts’ example makes use of the semantic
metatheory; one cannot distinguish the open half-plane and its translated model within the
theoretical language, since the models are isomorphic. At issue is whether one must invoke
the semantic metatheory in the way he does. Roberts’ picture of “concrete” representation
using a given physical theory seems to be that one first constructs formal models of a theory,
and then one identifies elements of the domains of those models with objects in the world.
In other words, for Roberts representation necessarily operates at the level of metatheory,
and models of a theory should be taken to have all of the structure describable at the
metatheoretic level. But this is a view of representation that advocates of the mathematical
response would reject, on the grounds that the representational capacities of mathematical
objects are precisely those preserved by isomorphism.
5. What Does the Mathematical Response Really Amount To?
We have argued in the foregoing that Mundy, Weatherall, and Shulman all raise the same
objection to the hole argument, despite invoking different mathematical formalisms to do
so. All of them claim that if spacetime has the structure of a pseudo-Riemannian manifold,
then, since pseudo-Riemannian manifolds are defined only up to isometry, the differences
between isometric models considered in the hole argument have no representational or se-
mantic significance. We then considered two counterarguments. Both begged the question
against the mathematical response: Rynasiewicz denied that spacetime has the structure of
a pseudo-Riemannian manifold and Roberts adopted a theory of representation rejected by
Mundy et al.
This discussion suggests that the real issue is what it means to say that some part
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of the world has a certain structure or is described by some theory. In this regard, it
parallels other, long-standing disputes in philosophy. Rynasiewicz (1996), in responding to
Mundy, suggests that the hole argument is analogous to the classic problem of reference,
raised by Quine (1969), Davidson (1979), and Putnam (1981). Given any model of a formal
theory representing some domain of discourse, one can always build an isomorphic model
by permuting elements of its domain and then pushing forward the properties, relations,
etc. along that permutation. But, the argument goes, this means the formal theory cannot
determine which model assigns these properties, etc. to the “right” object.
For Rynasiewicz, this analogy to the problem of reference shows that whether two models
of a formal theory can represent the same situation depends on further, extra-theoretic facts
about how we individuate objects. Roberts does not invoke the problem of reference, but
he seems to adopt a similar perspective, since within a given concrete representation, he
takes permutations on the domain of a model to generate changes in what physical objects
are taken to instantiate what properties. But the advocate for the mathematical response
would presumably deny that there is any problem of reference in the first place, at least for
theories that one takes to fully characterize their subject matter. After all, to generate the
problem for any given theory, one must move from the formal theory under consideration
to the metatheory. And the metatheory is representationally irrelevant.
To deny this in the case of GR is to deny that a century of physics has given us good
reasons to believe that space and time have a particular structure, fully characterized by a
theory where the correct standard of equivalence for its models is isometry. One chooses
such a formalism precisely because there is no physical reason to include more. Anyone who
wishes to claim that GR is incomplete in this regard needs to provide some justification for
extending the theory. And it is hard to see why that is motivated.
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